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ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN GREECE:  







The crisis in Greece has defined political and academic debates for 
more than two years. Following the deadlock-marred Greek Parliamentary 
elections of May 6, 2012, a new wave of political uncertainty spread over 
developments in the country, with the possibility of Greece exiting the 
euro zone becoming an ever more tangible reality that was discussed 
openly around the world. Although the June 17 elections reduced fears of 
an imminent “Grexit”, Greece remains present in mainstream media 
coverage worldwide, frequently perceived as a litmus test of the euro zone 
crisis (Visvizi 2012a). Clearly, the crisis in Greece is by no means a linear 
and simple process. The events concerning Greece that have shaped 
popular opinion and imagination since late 2009 form a sequence of 
different yet interrelated, and to some extent overlapping, crises that have 
beset Greece since 2008. In other words, it is possible to distinguish 
between the demand crisis and the liquidity crunch (2008–2009) caused by 
the global financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis (2010–present) related 
to a specific course of action taken by the Greek government in Autumn 
2009, and the progressing economic recession (2011–?) that resulted from 
an inappropriate policy-mix implemented by the socialist government 
under the aegis of the so-called Troika, i.e., representatives of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB), 
and the European Commission since 2010 (Visvizi 2012c). 
Although a rich body of literature has emerged in an attempt to offer 
insights into the correlated exogenous and endogenous causes of the crisis 
in Greece, a more focused discussion of the empirical pattern of the phases 
of the crisis in Greece is still largely absent. Specifically, more insight is 
required on the question of how particular policy instruments employed by 
the Greek authorities may have influenced/fuelled the subsequent stages of 
the crisis. Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to focus on the 
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relatively under-researched issue of the role and efficacy of fiscal policy 
and fiscal policy measures in addressing the crisis in Greece. The major 
thesis that this paper advances is that the front-loaded fiscal adjustment 
measures consistent with the introduction of excessive taxation and 
marginal expenditure reduction constricted economic activity in the 
country, leading to an exponential rise in unemployment, a dramatic fall in 
general government revenue, and increased expenditures on social 
transfers. Moreover, the paper argues with the very popular – yet 
inaccurate – view according to which tax evasion was and remains the 
main reason behind shrinking government revenue in Greece, and thus of 
the uncertain fate of the two loan facilities generously offered to Greece by 
its international partners. 
The argument is structured as follows: In the first section, the 
background of the €110 billion financial assistance package that Greece 
received in May 2010 is discussed briefly, and the major qualitative and 
quantitative performance criteria attached to the assistance programme are 
outlined. In the next section, the focus of the discussion is directed towards 
the scope of fiscal adjustment that was proposed and/or implemented in 
Greece over the period May 2010–June 2012. In what follows, the 
efficiency and appropriateness of the fiscal consolidation measures 
implemented in Greece as a means of addressing the crisis are examined. 
Subsequently, the thorny issue of tax compliance is raised. Conclusions 
follow. 
2. The background of the €110 billion financial 
assistance package for Greece 
A set of endogenous and exogenous variables led Greece to the brink 
of losing access to financial markets in early 2010. The state of Greece’s 
public finances was deteriorating, the economic forecasts for the country 
were alarming, the spreads for Greek treasury bills began rising in an 
uncontrolled manner, and Greece’s credit ratings fell to the “close to junk” 
category. As the outlook for Greece’s public finance was deteriorating (see 
Table 10-1 for more details), in early 2010 the then IMF managing-
director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, suggested an early debt restructuring 
for Greece, a proposal rejected by the then Prime Minister of Greece, 
George Papandreou. As time passed and Greece’s inability to service its 
debt became apparent, in March and April 2010, discussions were held at 
various levels in the EU regarding the means of addressing Greece’s 
insolvency problem. Although the ECB pushed the limits of its 
prerogatives by repurchasing Greek bonds, and a bailout was not an 
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option, the European Union (EU) did not have a mechanism to assist 
Greece. Therefore, two alternative methods to approach the crisis in 
Greece were discussed in the EU. Some EU leaders suggested a strictly 
European solution whereby the EU member states would offer bilateral 
loans to Greece. This approach was stymied by a view promoted by 
Angela Merkel, who argued that the IMF’s involvement was needed. The 
IMF’s engagement with a possible future rescue package for Greece 
offered the promise that conditions would be attached to the rescue loan 
granted to Greece. These loan conditions would in turn increase the 
probability that Greek authorities would comply with the terms of the loan 
and consequently not only repay it but also improve Greek public finances 
in line with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (Visvizi 
2012b). 
In May 2010, a financial assistance programme for Greece was agreed 
on by the Eurogroup and the IMF Board. This unprecedented loan, with a 
total value of €110 billion, was to be disbursed in twelve tranches over the 
period 2010–2013. The loan consisted of a €30 billion Stand-by 
Agreement (SBA) approved by the IMF and €80 billion in bilateral loans 
granted to Greece by euro zone member states, centrally pooled and 
managed by the European Commission. The implementation of the 
programme was to be overseen by the representatives of the Troika. The 
major objective of the joint EU-IMF €110 billion assistance package was 
to aid Greece in overcoming its debt crisis, revive growth, and modernise 
its economy. It was expected that by 2012, Greece would regain its ability 
to finance its debt. The major quantitative targets of the economic reform 
programme that the Greek government suggested, included a reduction in 
the gross government deficit, a gradual reduction in the debt to GDP ratio, 
and the restoration of economic growth. 
In principle, the economic reform programme approved by the Troika 
in May 2010 was based on fiscal consolidation and fiscal discipline that – 
coupled with structural reforms – were expected to yield positive 
outcomes in the form of growth and increased government revenue. The 
fiscal consolidation measures included in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) of May 2010 included front-loaded revenue 
enhancing measures, i.e., increases in tax rates and a broadening of the tax 
base, as well as plans for reducing expenditures, including reductions in 
public investments, the public sector’s operating costs and the wage 
burden. These measures were to be complemented by structural fiscal 
reforms focusing on tax administration, the reform of the tax collection 
mechanism, enhanced auditing, simplifying the general tax framework, 
and combatting tax evasion. The structural reform measures listed in the 
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programme included public administration reform, labour market and 
wage-negotiation reform, pension reform, healthcare reform, business 
environment reform, reforms aimed at promoting foreign direct investment 
and exports, and reforms increasing the levels of absorption of structural 
and cohesion funds. 
 
Table 10-1 The Greek economy: major macroeconomic & fiscal 
indicators 2008–2012 
 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
(target/ 
forecast) 
Total revenue  
% GDP 40.7 38.2 39.7 40.9 42.4 
in m. of EUR  94,833.0 88,601.0 90,247.0 88,075.0 86,267.50 
Total expenditure 
% GDP 50.6 53.8 50.2 50.1 47.7 
in m. of EUR 117,963.0 124,646.0 114,106.0 107,769.0 97,050.9 
Primary deficit/balance 
% GDP -4.8 -10.4 -4.7 -2.2 -1 
in m. of EUR -11,193.0 -24,128.0 -10,666.0 -4,664.0 -2,034.6 
Overall balance/deficit 
% GDP -9.8 -15.6 -10.5 -9.2 -7.3 
in m. of EUR -23,130.0 -36,045.0 -23,859.00 -19,694.00 -14,852.6 
Gross government debt 
% GDP 113 129.4 145 165.3 162.1 
in m. of EUR 263,284.0 299,685.0 329,535.0 355,617.0 329,810.30 
GDP  
growth rate -0.5 -3.6 -3.7 -6.9 -6.0* 
in m. of EUR 232,920.3 231,642.0 227,317.9 215,088.2 202,182.9* 
Current account balance 
% GDP -17.9 -14.3 -12.3 -11.3 -7.8 
in m. of EUR -41,692.7 -33,124.8 -27,959.1 -24,304.9 -15,869.9 
Unemployment 
in %  7.7 9.5 12.6 17.7 19.7 
Inflation rate (HICP) 
in %  4.2 1.3 4.7 3.1 -0.5 
Source: Eurostat; forecasts for 2012 from: European Commission (2012b); * from 
Alpha Bank (2012) 
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Overall, the objectives set in the MoU followed the traditional recipe 
of fiscal consolidation that the IMF tends to offer as a lender of last resort. 
In this sense, these objectives delineated a routine means of assisting a 
country in the restoration of its shattered public finance. In the case of 
Greece, however, as insiders would have argued, the programme suffered 
from three significant drawbacks from the beginning. On the one hand, the 
programme was founded on incorrect assumptions regarding the nature of 
the crisis in Greece. That is, the crisis was initially approached by Greek 
authorities and Greece’s European and international partners as a liquidity 
problem. Thus, the structural causes of the crisis were downplayed in the 
MoU. On the other hand, the fiscal consolidation targets and especially the 
extremely short time-span within which fiscal consolidation was to be 
implemented, were overly ambitious and thus unfeasible. 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the MoU of May 2010 was 
largely identical to the provisions of the Updated Hellenic Stability and 
Growth Programme (SP 2010) approved by the Ecofin in February 2010. 
In addition, the MoU incorporated an excessively stringent Tax Law in 
April 2010 (applied retroactively as of January 2010) passed in haste by 
the PASOK parliamentary majority prior to the arrival of IMF officials in 
Athens. In this sense, the design of the fiscal consolidation programme of 
May 2010 created vast opportunities for the Greek socialist government 
(PASOK) to employ the programme in an instrumental way. Here it is 
worth considering the fact that the fiscal consolidation programme 
assumed the possibility of cyclical de facto readjustment of the 
programme’s quantitative objectives. That is, if a progress report produced 
by the Troika on a three-month basis were to reveal discrepancies in the 
quantitative performance criteria, to keep the programme on target, new 
fiscal policy measures would be introduced to guarantee the programme’s 
success. This mechanism allowed the socialist government to shift the 
burden of fiscal adjustment away from the public sector and thus away 
from expenditure reducing measures towards the private sector and 
revenue enhancing measures. Specifically, as presented in Table 10-2, 
several of the expenditure reducing measures were either not implemented 
or came into force with a significant delay or in an amended, “soft” 
version, thus having little impact on the strained state budget. 
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Table 10-2 Major consolidation measures in the authorities' programme 
of May 2010: commitments vs. implementation 
 
 Revenue-enhancing measures Implementation 
1 Increase in VAT rates & base 04/2010 
2 Increase in excise tax on fuel 01/2010 
3 Increase in excise tax on cigarettes 01/2010 
4 Increase in excise tax on alcohol 01/2010 
5 Luxury goods tax (yachts, cars, pools)* 01/2010 
6 Taxation on unauthorised establishments 01/2010 
7 Gaming royalties 01/2010 
8 Gaming licenses 01/2010 
9 Special/emergency levies on profitable firms 01/2010 
10 Levies on illegal buildings 01/2010 
11 Green tax 01/2010 
12 Presumptive taxation (“amnesty”) 01/2010 
13 Increase in administratively set prices of real 
estate 
01/2010 
14 Increase in taxation of real estate 04/2010 
15 Privatisation Practically none until 09/2012 
 Expenditure-reducing measures Implementation 
1 Wage bill (13th, 14th wage, allowances) Late 2011, several exceptions 
applied 
2 Intermediate consumption 11/11 & 07/12 
3 Pension cuts & freeze 2010 & 2011 & 2012 
4 Elimination of solidarity allowance 
(introduced 10/09) 
No 
5 Public investment reduction 2010, 2011, 2012 
6 Introduction of unified public sector wages 11/2011, several exceptions 
applied; the majority of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) did 
not conform with it; 
7 Local administration reform (“Kalikrates”) 
savings 
questionable 
8 Reduction in operational expenditure minimal 
9 Reduction in public employment illusory 
10 Unidentified measures   
Source: Adapted by the author from: European Commission (2010) 
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Simultaneously, all of the planned revenue enhancing measures were 
implemented on time with further policy instruments being added 
periodically, thus increasing the tax burden on the private sector. Increases 
in taxation, e.g., personal and corporate income taxes, and the imposition 
of new taxes, e.g., emergency contributions from vehicles, yachts, 
motorbikes and pools; levies on credit cards and cheques; and surcharges 
on mobile telephony, have been complemented by the introduction of the 
so-called income thresholds. These administratively established thresholds 
effectively increase the taxable income base, in that taxation – rather than 
being imposed on real income – is imposed on an estimated (and thus 
usually exaggerated) annual maintenance cost of a vehicle, a house, an 
apartment, etc. The thresholds are also imposed on tuition fees, healthcare 
expenses, etc. A focused study of these thresholds would reveal a direct 
correlation between their imposition and plummeting consumer demand 
for goods and services. As the discussion in this paper will depict, as a 
result of the overemphasis on revenue-enhancing measures, an expenditure 
drift occurred over the period 2010–2011. The socialist government sought 
to balance this situation with additional tax increases, a practice that the 
authorities legitimised by producing the myth of tax evasion in Greece. 
3. The scope of fiscal consolidation in Greece 2010–2012 
To obtain insights into the scope of the fiscal adjustment in Greece, in 
the following paragraphs, the milestones of the (planned) fiscal adjustment 
effort over the period 2010–2012 are described. By contrast, Table 10-3 
offers a summary picture of the scope of the fiscal consolidation process in 
Greece as recorded by IMF authorities. Six milestones in the fiscal 
adjustment effort in Greece can be distinguished. These include: 
1) provisions of the MoU of May 2010 for the period 2010–2012; 2) the 
Medium-Term Fiscal Adjustment Strategy (MTFS) of June 2011 for the 
period 2012–2015; 3) additional, very specific tax laws introduced in 
September 2011 following a rather difficult negotiation round with the 
Troika; 4) the “voluntary bond exchange programme” of November 2011; 
5) the 2nd MoU of March 2012; and 6) measures discussed by the 
coalition government in summer 2012 to be implemented as of 2013. 
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Table 10-3 The scope of fiscal adjustment: measures executed 




(outcome or projection)  
Measures 
(implemented in or identified for 
a given year) 
 in m. of EUR % GDP  in m. of EUR % GDP 
2009 36,624.0 15.8 in 2010 19,074.0 8.4 
2010 24,125.0 10.6 in 2011 16,680.0 7.7 
2011 20,002.0 9.3 in 2012 13,0191.0 6.5 
2012 14,779.0 7.3 for 2013 1,584.0 0.8 
  in 2013 7,639.0 3.8 
2013 9,359.0 4.6 for 2014 3,065.0 1.5 
  in 2014 4,016.0 1.9 
2014 4,404.0 2.1  
Cumulative 51,969.0 30.6 
Source: Adapted by the author from European Commission (2012a) 
 
(1) The fiscal consolidation measures included in the MoU of May 
2010 aimed to increase tax revenue and cut expenditures. The measures 
designed to increase tax revenue were largely based on the provisions of 
the Tax Law adopted on April 23, 2010 (Law 3842/2010). This law 
provided for increases in VAT rates; increases in the excise taxes on fuel, 
cigarettes and alcohol; the introduction of a luxury goods tax (yachts, 
pools, and cars); special emergency levies on profitable firms; presumptive 
taxation (frequently inaccurately referred to as a “tax amnesty”); and steep 
increases in tax rates on property, followed by the introduction of new tax 
measures on property (European Commission 2010, 17). According to the 
government plans, revenues would be increased by the equivalent of 
approximately 4% of GDP through 2013 (MoU 2010, 8). The cuts in 
spending were to be achieved through nominal wage cuts in the public 
sector of approximately 7% of the basic salary (thus leaving other forms of 
compensation and benefits – notably constituting a lion’s share of 
remuneration in the public sector – intact); reductions in Easter, summer 
and Christmas bonuses and allowances; nominal pension cuts of 9% 
through a reduction in Easter, summer and Christmas bonuses; and a 
reduction in the largest pensions. Other measures included intermediate 
consumption cuts (e.g. managing ministry expenses) and a reduction in 
public investments (MoF 2010a). Overall, the government presented a 
rather ambitious programme of fiscal consolidation of a rare scale, i.e., 
7.8% of GDP in the first year of the process (MoF 2011a, 8). In line with 
the government’s plans, the reduction in the general government deficit of 
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5.0 percentage points (p.p.) in 2010 was to be followed by a 3 p.p. 
reduction in 2011, thus bringing the deficit from 15.4% of GDP in 2009 to 
7.4% in 2011. The government declared that “fiscal measures will amount 
to more than 8 p.p. of GDP, but the nominal deficit drift in 2011 (the 
increase in interest payments, pension expenditures and other structural 
expenditures that would take place without the measures) is expected to 
reach 5 p. p. of GDP” (MoF 2011a, 8). 
(2) The Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy 2012–2015 (MTFS) approved 
by the Greek Parliament in June 2011 provided for additional fiscal 
consolidation measures valued at €28.3 billion (12% of GDP) for the 
period 2011–15. The MTFS’ objective was to reduce the general government 
deficit from 7.5% of GDP in 2011 to 2.6% of GDP in 2014. The MTFS 
included additional fiscal consolidation measures worth €6.5 billion or 
2.9% of GDP in 2011 (23.1% of the total fiscal effort), €6.8 billion or 
3.0% of GDP in 2012 (24.0% of the total), €5.2 billion or 2.2% of GDP in 
2013 (18.5% of the total), and €5.4 billion or 2.2% of GDP in 2014 (19.3% 
of the total fiscal effort). The government’s plan was to further reduce the 
general government deficit to approximately 1% of GDP in 2015, with 
measures worth €4.3 billion or 1.7% of GDP. Regarding reductions in 
public expenditures, the MTFS aimed to decrease such expenditures from 
51.4% of GDP in 2011 to approximately 44.4% of GDP in 2015 after the 
implementation of the measures. These reductions would include cuts in 
social transfers from 24% of GDP in 2011 to 20.0% in 2015; a reduction in 
the public sector wage bill from 9.6% of GDP in 2011 to 6.6% in 2015; 
and a reduction in intermediate consumption from 5.2% of GDP in 2011 to 
3.0% in 2015 (MoF 2011b, 2–3). Regarding revenue measures, the MTFS 
foresaw a decrease in public revenues from 40.9% of GDP in 2011 to 
37.6% of GDP in 2015 following the lapse of certain one-off measures 
taken in 2010 and 2011. However, public revenues were also expected to 
increase to 43.2% of GDP by 2015. “This rise in general government 
revenues [would] be driven mainly by increases in direct tax revenue 
(from 7.0% of GDP in 2011 to 8.2% in 2015); in indirect tax revenue 
(from 12.2% of GDP in 2011 to 13.2% in 2015); and a rise in social 
contributions from 9.5% of GDP in 2011 to 10.5% in 2015” (MoF 
2011b, 3). 
(3) In September 2011, on the occasion of a periodic review mission to 
Greece and in the face of a significant fiscal drift, dramatic negotiations 
took place in Athens with the Troika’s representatives leaving the 
negotiating room. As news reports suggested, the subject of the 
disagreement was the larger than expected budget deficit projected for 
2011. According to the Troika, the projected deficit was approximately 
Addressing the Crisis in Greece: The Role of Fiscal Policy 
 
220
8.6%–8.7% of GDP due to omissions and gaps in the government’s policy. 
The government maintained that the deficit would be more than 1.1 p.p. 
smaller than the IMF’s estimates. On this basis, the government did not 
want to introduce any additional measures to balance out the expenditure 
drift. There was also a significant disagreement on the issue of privatisation, 
which in any case was delayed by the socialist government. As a result of 
the September talks with the Troika, the disbursement of the 6th tranche of 
the financial assistance to Greece was halted. In addition, the Troika called 
for additional measures valued at €1.7 billion on the grounds of a revenue-
lag of ca. €1.1 billion and increased spending of €600 million related to 
pension funds. To raise the required €1.7 billion and thus release the 
disbursement of the 6th tranche of the loan, the PASOK government 
introduced a new tax on property. This highly controversial tax will be 
discussed in the next section.  
(4) In February 2012, a “voluntary bond exchange programme” 
brokered by the Institute of International Finance (IIF) was enacted. The 
value of the bond exchange programme was set at a level of 53.5% 
(compared to the initially planned 50%). In other words, in line with the 
agreement, bonds in the hands of private creditors will be exchanged for 
new ones with nominal values corresponding to 46.5% of the “old” bonds. 
The actual loss that the creditors will incur amounts to, on average, 74%, 
largely due to the loss of future interest payments. The new bonds are 
issued by the Greek government (31% of the total) and the European 
Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) (15%) under English law (previously, the 
bulk of Greek bonds had a Greek law clause attached to them). As for the 
interest rates, depending on the maturity of the bonds, their holders will 
garner a 2% profit (for bonds maturing over the period February 2012 – 
February 2015), a 3% profit (for bonds maturing over the period 
February 2015 – February 2020), and a 4.3% profit for bonds maturing 
over the period February 2020 – February 2042. Moreover, as of 2015, the 
creditors participating in the bond exchange scheme will be entitled to a 
minor increase in interest rates should economic growth in Greece exceed 
the targets established in the agreement with the EU and the IMF. As a 
result of the programme, the share of Greek public debt that is held by 
private creditors will be reduced by 53.5%, which constitutes 
approximately 2/3 of Greek debt. Since in 2011 the value of Greek debt 
amounted to ca. €356 billion (ca. 165% of GDP), the bond exchange 
programme is expected to result in an effective debt reduction of ca. 
€109 billion. This reduction will allow Greece’s debt burden to be reduced 
by €3.2 billion annually, which – under specific circumstances – could 
allow the debt level to reach 120.5% of GDP by 2020 (Visvizi 2012d). 
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(5) On March 15, 2012, the IMF Executive Board approved a four-year 
€28 billion arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for 
Greece in support of the authorities’ economic adjustment programme. 
The details of the programme were laid out in the Second Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU II) supported by a financial assistance package of a 
total value of €130 billion co-financed by the IMF and the EU. The IMF’s 
decision to participate in the EU-IMF €130 billion four-year financial 
assistance programme for Greece completed the chain of events that was 
set in motion on October 26, 2011. In line with the agreement reached at 
that time, following a debt-restructuring arrangement, a new rescue 
package would be offered to Greece. The purpose of this package was to 
assist the country with meeting its payment obligations and to recapitalize 
Greek banks that would incur huge losses as a result of the bond exchange 
scheme. The support from the EU and IMF was conditional on Greece 
securing private creditors’ participation in the “voluntary bond exchange 
programme” and adopting a series of additional reform and fiscal 
consolidation measures. The MoU II primarily concerned structural 
spending reforms, which required additional measures beyond those 
already approved in the context of the 2011 MTFS and the 2012 budget. 
The programme required 1.5% of GDP worth of measures in 2012, 1.5% 
of GDP in tax administration improvements, and a further 5.5% of GDP 
worth of spending measures in 2013–14 to achieve the primary surplus 
target of 4.5% of GDP by 2014. As stated in MoU II, “[t]he bulk of 
adjustment will be achieved through expenditure cuts that aim at 
permanently reducing the size of the state and improving government 
efficiency, including by closing entities that no longer provide a cost-
effective public service and by targeted reductions in public employment. 
Many of these cuts will need to fall on social transfers, the category of 
spending which increased most explosively in the post euro accession 
period” (IMF 2012, 7). The first tranche (€1.65 billion) of the financial aid 
was disbursed on Friday, March 16, 2012. 
(6) Shortly after the Parliamentary Elections of June 17, 2012, which 
resulted in the formation of a coalition government (Visvizi 2012a), 
additional fiscal consolidation measures were discussed. To ensure that the 
2012 budget deficit remained manageable, the governing coalition agreed 
on additional measures generating €3 billion in expenditure savings. These 
measures would involve reductions in ministry operating costs, the 
cancellation of some benefits received by the cabinet, as well as further 
reductions in pension levels and social transfers, among other measures. 
Moreover, throughout the summer of 2012, discussions were held 
regarding additional measures worth a total of €11.5 billion to be 
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introduced over the period 2013–14. These measures (to be approved in 
September 2012) foresee a significant decrease in the general government 
expenditures to be achieved, among others, via reduction of employment 
in the public sector. 
4. Expenditure-reducing measures in Greece:  
their efficiency and appropriateness 
In discussing the efficiency and appropriateness of the fiscal consolidation 
measures implemented in Greece over the period 2010–2012, it is 
necessary to emphasise that contrary to the initial provisions of the MoU, 
the burden of fiscal adjustment was shifted towards the private sector. 
Table 10-2 attests to this shift. Moreover, although – as seen from the 
perspective of the last two years – Greece’s consolidation efforts have 
been considerable, neither the revenue enhancing measures nor the 
expenditure reducing efforts were as successful as the government and the 
Troika had expected. This raises some questions about the appropriateness 
of the design and of the assumptions underlying the fiscal consolidation 
programme agreed for Greece. For instance, one of the questions is, why 
regardless of the obvious signs of a deepening recession in the Greek 
economy, additional strain was imposed on the private sector via multiple 
increases in taxation. This issue is particularly relevant given the fact that 
one of the major weaknesses of the Greek economy is related to the 
excessive size of the public sector and the abusive role of the state in the 
economy. It is the private sector that – irrespective of the squeezed liberal 
space in Greece – used to keep the economy going and provided the means 
to finance the public sector. Paradoxically however, the fiscal 
consolidation programme implemented over the period 2009–2012, rather 
than supporting the “healthier lung” of the Greek economy, in a systematic 
way led to the exhaustion of the private sector. Clearly, several other 
questions regarding the empirical pattern of fiscal adjustment in Greece 
still need to be answered in future research. In the following paragraphs, 
the largely failed attempts at reducing expenditures will be discussed. In 
the next section some details explaining the revenue drift will be outlined.  
One of the flagship reforms advertised by the PASOK government 
throughout 2010 concerned the pension system. The objective of the 
reform was to simplify the fragmented pension system, enhance 
transparency and fairness, increase and equalise the retirement ages1 and 
                                                          
1 For instance, the statutory retirement age for women was to be extended by 5 
years to age 65 to match the retirement age for men. Successively, the statutory 
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decrease the unfounded generosity of retirement benefits available to the 
public sector employees,2 while preserving adequate pension levels for the 
low- and middle-income earners (MoU II, 8). Moreover, to generate 
further savings, state contributions (in the form of grants) to the 
supplementary (public) pension funds that exist in Greece were to be 
decreased by reducing the number of the funds (from 13 to 3 by the end of 
2018) and by diminishing the value of transfers to eligible pensioners.3 
None of the above plans was implemented until 2012. Instead, the socialist 
government introduced three successive cuts to pension levels over the 
period 2010 – May 2012. However, irrespective of the dramatic cuts in 
pension levels, the general government expenditures on pensions and 
grants to social security funds increased substantially over the period 
2010–2012 (see Table 10-4 for details). One of the reasons behind this 
“overshooting” is related to the government deliberately avoiding 
restructuring the public sector. 
                                                                                                                         
retirement age was to be extended to age 67 for both men and women. In addition, 
early retirement below the age of 60 was to be curtailed. In line with the provisions 
of the existing regulations, employees can draw a pension below that age if they 
have paid contributions for a certain number of years or had children under 18. 
2 In line with the existing regulations, upon their retirement the public sector 
employees would receive a generous one-off payment/bonus ranging from €30,000 
for the lowest-rank employees to ca. €160,000 for the medium-rank civil servants. 
The retirement bonuses granted to employees of the Bank of Greece would reach 
the value of €400,000. As the data revealed by the coalition government in August 
2012 suggest, these values are disproportionate to the total value of individual 
contributions and beyond what the retirement funds can afford. In August 2012, 
Antonis Samaras, head of the coalition government, ordered the bonuses disbursed 
in 2011 and 2012 to be paid back. 
3 It should be noted that several of the funds had very good financial positions, 
which was a reflection of prudent financial management by the individuals who 
established them. Consequently, the complementary pension transfers to fund 
members that these funds could afford did not constitute any burden whatsoever on 
the state budget. Of course, contrasting examples exist. The thrust of the reform 
was to treat all funds – unfairly so – as if all of them were in financial difficulty. 
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Table 10-4 Expenditures on pensions & contributions to social security 
funds in millions of EUR 
 
 2010 2011 2012
Pensions 6.25 6.572 6.511
Funds 10.376 11.78 13.119
Sum 16.626 18.352 19.63
% GDP 7.31 8.53 9.71*
*indicates GDP size with a recession estimated at 6%
Source: MoF (2010b, 2011c, 2012) 
 
The question of the size and efficiency of Greece’s public sector has 
been a recurrent topic in the official discourse on the crisis in Greece. Low 
productivity, a lack of transparency, a high degree of unionisation, 
corruption, and causing a burden on the state budget are the most accurate 
descriptors of the public sector in Greece. “Low and middle-rank civil 
servants have higher wages than similar private sector employees, 
although they work on average fewer hours and have greater job security” 
(OECD 2011a, 11). The public sector in Greece nourishes clientele’s 
connections and generates countless functional spill-overs for the entire 
economy. In this sense, the Greek public sector resembles bureaucratic 
communist public sectors. Regarding the size of the Greek public sector, it 
is not easy to reconcile the official data produced by relevant ministries or 
published by international institutions such as the OECD or IMF. 
Specifically, data provided by the Greek Ministry of Administrative 
Reform indicate that the general government employment was 715,882 in 
2009, 683,627 in 2010 and 664,223 in 2011 (European Commission 
2012a, 24). These numbers would suggest a rather small public sector, an 
observation also made by the OECD (2011b, 2). It is important to stress, 
however, that the official records do not include all of the employees of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs); the data do not include countless experts 
and committee members employed (and remunerated generously) by all of 
the ministries and other government bodies; the data do not include 
employees without tenure, referred to in Greece as “stagiaires.” Accordingly, 
the above numbers concerning the size of the Greek public sector should 
be increased by another 250,000, with the cost of its maintenance “hidden” 
in extra-budgetary accounts. To obtain a complete picture of the scale of 
the problem that the public sector generates in Greece, it is worth noting 
that in late 2009, ca. 100,000 public sector employees opted for early 
retirement, fearing the consequences of the planned pension reform and 
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taking advantage of the generous compensation and benefit schemes that 
the public sector pension regime used to offer.  
Overall, the question of the size of the public sector in Greece and the 
cost that it generates for the state budget has been beset by confusion and 
conflicting arguments during the last two years, with the socialist 
government being unwilling to downsize it and the Troika exerting no 
particular pressure on the government to change the status quo. In 2011, 
the plan was to place some 30,000 employees on reserve; an alternative 
solution was to move employees across the public sector according to 
demand. While the successes of the first measure were insignificant, the 
alternative solution produced anecdotal outcomes in the form of, for 
example, public railway company employees being moved to state 
museums and crowding the museum cafeterias rather than offering 
assistance to tourists. 
Considering the problem of the public sector from the fiscal 
consolidation perspective, as Table 10-5 demonstrates, the nominal value 
of expenditures on wages and salaries (however, including only the central 
government, hospitals and other government bodies and excluding the 
SOEs4) decreased slightly over the period 2010–2012. However, given the 
economic recession, the percentage change in expenditures relative to 
GDP has been negligible, thus indicating a sustained need of serious 
consolidation efforts in the public sector. Until now, as a means of 
avoiding the political cost related to possible public sector restructuring, 
the PASOK government deliberately channelled the burden of fiscal 
adjustment in Greece to the already squeezed private sector. In this way, 
the public sector, including the civil servants, SOEs and the powerful trade 
unions, were spared from the dramatic experience of fiscal adjustment that 
the rest of the Greek society endured over the period 2010–2012.5 One 
could argue that as a result of this politically driven selective approach to 
how to split the burden of fiscal consolidation, the PASOK government 
aggravated the cleavage that exists between the public and the private 
sectors in Greece and thus between the relevant groups of the population. 
It is worth noting that any media discussion of downsizing the public 
sector stumbles on the argument that public sector employees will be fired. 
                                                          
4 In August 2012 it was revealed that the majority of SOEs did not conform to the 
2011 law providing for the introduction of a uniform salary scheme for the civil 
servants and the SOEs, i.e., they maintained the excessively high levels of salaries, 
compensation and benefits intact. 
5 Note, that wages in the private sector have been substantially reduced in 2011 and 
2012, while the minimum salary level for employees under the age of 25 has been 
set at the level of €571. 
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In this context, the negative socio-economic consequences thereof are 
pointed to. At the same time, however, people seem to have reconciled 
with the 1 million-plus unemployed individuals who lost their jobs in the 
private sector.6 The paradox is that these individuals would not have lost 
their jobs had the socialist government restructured the public sector, 
hence had it reduced the general government expenditure, and – through 
liberalization and deregulation – limited the role of the state in the 
economy. In this way, there would be no need to move to excessive 
taxation aimed at balancing the expenditure drift. 
 
Table 10-5 Expenditures on wages & salaries 2010–2012, in 
millions of EUR 
 
 2010 2011 2012 
Central 
government 
wages & salaries 12,180 11,340 10,439 
other allowances 312 7 283 
productivity bonus 597 517 36 
ΕΟΠΥΥ 0 0 444 
Salaries for hospital personnel and other 
government bodies 3,318 3,102 2,765 
Sum  16,407 14,970 13,967 
% GDP  7.22 6.95 6.91* 
*based on the assumption of a recession of the size of 6% of GDP; 
ΕΟΠΥΥ: National Organisation for Healthcare Provision; 
Source: MoF (2010b, 2011c, 2012) 
 
Overall, as depicted in Table 10-6, some progress has been achieved 
with regard to controlling expenditures in Greece during 2010–2012. 
However, the failed pension system reform did not yield any outcomes in 
the form of reduced expenditures. Rather, the three consecutive cuts in 
pension levels forced many elderly citizens into poverty. Moreover, the 
local administration reform known as “Kalikrates”, which the PASOK 
government argued was a major achievement in terms of savings, led to 
organisational chaos in municipalities rather than decreasing public 
expenditures. Notably, although presented as a novelty, the local 
administration reform was scheduled and planned for years by the 
socialists, mainly to influence the distribution of political support in the 
                                                          
6 The tragedy of the situation is that the majority of these unemployed are not 
eligible for unemployment support/benefits, as is the case with self-employed 
owners of shops, taverns, small manufacturing entities, etc. 
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Greek countryside in view of future elections. Finally, the restructuring of 
the public sector, a reform that would have yielded multiple gains for the 
Greek economy, has been largely avoided by the PASOK government for 
reasons of political convenience. 
 
Table 10-6 General government expenditures: major categories of 
expenditure 2007–2011, excluding extra-budgetary funds 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Compensation of employees, payable 
% GDP 11.4 12 13.4 12.2 12.1 
in m. of EUR 25,464.0 27,986.0 31,002.0 27,770.0 26,066.0 
Social benefits (other than in kind social transfers) 
% GDP 17.9 19.6 21.1 20.8 21.9 
in m. of EUR 39,941.0 45,757.0 48,972.0 47,220.0 47,026.0 
Expenditures on local government 
% GDP 2.7 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.9 
in m. of EUR 6,013.0 6,675.0 7,651.0 6,465.0 6,306.0 
Total general government expenditures 
% GDP 47.6 50.6 53.8 50.2 50.1 
in m. of EUR 106,009.0 117,963.0 124,646.0 114,106.0 107,769.0 
Source: Eurostat 
5. Revenue-enhancing measures in Greece:  
their efficiency and appropriateness 
The government sought to increase revenues by broadening the tax 
base and introducing new temporary and permanent tax measures. Over 
the period 2010–2012, several tax increases (affecting both natural and 
legal persons) were introduced, while tax exemptions and discounts were 
largely abolished. However, as Table 10-A1 demonstrates, irrespective of 
increased excise duties, the steep increases in taxation, and regardless of a 
number of emergency levies imposed on companies, personal income, 
property, and the so-called luxury goods, a significant revenue-drift has 
occurred over the period 2010–2012. Rather than being offset by 
expenditure reducing measures, the revenue-drift was addressed with 
further increases in taxation. As the tax measures introduced over the 
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period January 2010 – March 2012 have been incommensurate with the 
companies’ and individuals’ ability to pay, the private economy contracted 
and unemployment exploded to 23.1% in May 2012, compared to 16.8% 
in May 2011 (ELSTAT 2012b). 
According to the results of a study conducted on a sample of 1,200 
small and medium-sized enterprises in Greece, 64.7% anticipate that the 
situation of their businesses will deteriorate in the second half of 2012. 
The commercial and services sectors will be the most affected by the 
worsening economic situation in the country. The same study reveals that 
almost 190,000 enterprises face a high risk of closing. The net loss of 
businesses during the next 12 months is estimated to be 67,000, which 
implies a risk of further job losses amounting to 260,000, including 
employers, the self-employed and employees (IME GSEVEE 2012). 
Currently, several of the companies that continue to exist either do not 
remunerate their employees in full or do not do so regularly and on time. 
Finally, it should be noted that the general government revenues from 
taxation decreased by ca. 8% in 2010 and by a further ca. 4% in 2011. 
Further decrease in revenue collection on account of taxation is expected 
to take place in 2012. In addition, companies’ contributions to the public 
insurance funds decreased dramatically over the period 2010–2012, thus 
creating an additional strain on the state budget. Specifically, data indicate 
that by July 2012 these funds consumed 74.2% of resources assigned to 
them in the 2012 state budget. Taking into account the estimates of an 
economic recession of at least 6% in 2012, the prospects for the execution 
of the state budget are grim. It is for this reason that the Troika demanded 
that the new coalition government imposed an additional €3 billion in 
expenditure-reducing measures for 2012 alone. As noted earlier, a package 
of additional measures of the value of €11.5 billion for the years 2013–
2014 was scheduled to be approved by the Greek Parliament in September 
2012. 
With regard to indirect taxation, over the period 2010–2011, VAT rates 
were raised three times, i.e., in March 2010 (from 4.5% to 5.0%, 9.0% to 
10.0%, and 19.0% to 21%), in July 2010 (from 5.0 to 5.5%, 10.0% to 
11.0%, and 21% to 23%), and in January 2011 (from 5.5% to 6.5% and 
11% to 13%). It should be noted that the range of goods and services 
covered by the highest VAT rates increased significantly, and the lowest 
rate is rarely applied. Faced with a demand crisis and negative consumer 
sentiments, Greek businesses were forced to absorb the successive 
increases in VAT rates, thus decreasing their already marginal gains, to 
maintain price levels. In this context, it is important to highlight one of the 
most contested changes in VAT policy, which concerns the gastronomy 
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sector, retail food and beverages. As of September 2011, VAT rates 
increased from 13% to 23%, thus causing an additional pressure on the 
owners of restaurants, bars, taverns, etc. Clearly, the majority of prices 
increased in such establishments, thus affecting the already damaged 
competitiveness of these sectors that are so important for the Greek 
tourism industry. 
Regarding excise duties and other taxes imposed on the petroleum 
products sector, over the period June 2010–June 2012, the cost of 
petroleum products increased, mainly due to taxes, by 80%, with the 
average price for 1 litre of unleaded petrol reaching €1,743 by the end of 
July 2012.7 Further increases in price levels are expected due to a rise in 
distillation costs (POPEK 2012). Considering the declining purchasing 
power of Greek consumers, in the first half of 2011, consumption levels 
plummeted to 35% compared to a comparable period in 2008. A 13% 
decrease in gasoline consumption was recorded in the first quarter of 2011 
(compared to the first quarter of 2010) in addition to a 19% decrease in 
diesel consumption. Accordingly, since 2010, more than 1,200 gasoline 
stations have been closed, and 1,000 more will close by the end of 2012, 
thus causing job losses of ca. 5,000. 
Another highly contested set of tax measures concerns property taxes. 
To understand these measures, it is necessary to outline some basic 
features of the Greek property market. That is, 8 out of 10 Greeks own 
some form of property, such as an apartment, a house, a plot of land, or a 
property designed for professional use. In Greece, it is common to inherit 
property. Thus, owning property is not the same as having income. 
Nevertheless, confusion and several myths beset the issue of property 
(taxation) in Greece, with the most common misconception being that 
property owners should be paying extra taxes simply because they own it. 
This incorrect view, expressed frequently in the public discourse in 
Greece, links – wrongly so – ownership of property to the ability to pay 
increased taxation. Clearly, and it should be emphasized, as long as 
property is not rented or subject to a sales contract, it generates no profits. 
Thus, the owners’ ability to pay taxes on account of owning either a plot of 
land, a house/apartment used for living, or an unrented apartment is nil, 
because no correlation between owning a property and the income level 
exists. 
                                                          
7 According to the 2012 Bloomberg Gas Price Ranking that sorts 60 countries by 
average price at the pump and by “pain at the pump”, locates Greece at the 9th 
position as regards the “most-expensive-gas”, and at the 26th position as regards 
the “pain at the pump”, i.e. well ahead of the UK, France or Germany. 
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The steep increases in property taxation in Greece have had severe 
ramifications, e.g., on the rental market, the construction sector and 130 
related industries and on general government revenue (see Table 10-A1 for 
details). With respect to the rental market, as the economy contracts, 
demand falls, and the tax burden increases, a 50% decrease in rents (for 
offices, stores, and apartments) has taken place across Greece, with 
countless stores and offices available for rent even in central locations of 
Athens. Despite the fact that a 20–30% decrease was observed in rental 
prices over the period 2010–2012, demand still does not match supply. 
Accordingly, the number of transactions in the real estate sector decreased 
from nearly 40,000 in the fourth quarter of 2007 to less than 10,000 in the 
fourth quarter of 2011, while the value of the transactions plummeted. 
Regarding the construction sector, it should be noted that following the 
liquidity crunch in 2009 and 2010, augmented by increases in taxation, the 
number of building permits decreased from 42,891 (over the period May-
April 2010–211) to 35,393 (over the period May-April 2011–2012), 
constituting a 17.5% decline. However, the decline in building area was 
even more spectacular, reaching a value of 30.5% over the same time-
frame (ELSTAT 2012a, 3). 
As a footnote in the discussion of property taxation in Greece, one 
should mention yet another direct tax levied on it. Imposed temporarily for 
a period of two years, i.e., 2011 and 2012, this special property tax 
imposes payments on real estate (€0.50 – €20.00 per square metre) to be 
collected via electricity bills. The planned revenue increase from this 
measure was estimated to be €1.7 billion annually. The enforcement of this 
measure was to be improved by eliminating access to electricity in cases of 
non-payment. Several problems, contingencies and controversies plague 
this tax measure. On the one hand, a very important constitutionality 
question was raised in that it is illegal for the Public Power Corporation 
(ΔΕΗ) to arbitrarily decide to shut off power for reasons other than 
electricity consumption. In fact, in March 2012, the Council of the State 
ruled against power being shut off if the property tax is not paid. On the 
other hand, several unintended exceptions in the imposition of this tax 
measure were revealed; similarly, several accounting mistakes were 
detected. Finally, the primary problem related to this tax measure is that it 
is detached from the income of the tax payer. Although in March 5, 2012, 
the Council of Ministers decided to replace the special property tax with a 
new tax as of 2013, to generate revenues €2.3 billion per year, the fate of 
this tax measure remains uncertain. The most probable scenario is that it 
will be incorporated in the ordinary property taxation. 
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In any discussion on fiscal consolidation and structural reform, the 
question of privatisation cannot be omitted. In the case of Greece, the 
privatisation process is particularly important in that rather than producing 
imminent privatisation receipts,8 it may trigger a path-dependent restoration 
of the Greek economic system and thus push Greece onto a growth path. 
In other words, it has to be noted that privatisation in Greece should not be 
conceived of as a fire-sale to generate one-off revenues. Rather, 
privatisation should be regarded as a process that will allow for the 
deregulation, liberalization and restructuring of the Greek economy, 
downsizing the public sector, and limiting general government 
expenditures (Visvizi 2012b). In addition, an added bonus of privatising 
the SOEs is that it may contribute to breaking the monopoly and the 
influence that the trade unions exert in Greece. Nevertheless, although 
privatisation holds a great deal of promise, it seems that Greece’s socialist 
government and the Troika itself adopted a misconceived approach to this 
process. Although over the period 2004–2009, the then centre-right 
government of Nea Democratia successfully accomplished privatisations 
valued at €11 billion, thus suggesting that privatisation in Greece is 
feasible, the MoU of 2010 contains only the following laconic statement 
on the matter: “Prepare a privatisation plan for the divestment of state 
assets and enterprises with the aim to raise at least €1 billion a year during 
the period 2011–2013” (MoU 2010, 45). 
In 2011, the Troika exerted significant pressure on the government to 
draft a privatisation plan valued at €50 billion; however, without any 
tangible results. In contrast, the MoU II includes several provisions on 
privatisation, the most specific of which is that “the government 
anticipates €50bn in proceeds over the lifetime of the asset sale program, 
including at least €19bn through 2015” (European Commission 2012a, 
108). Although in August 2012 the coalition government opened several 
tender procedures for the exploitation of property and for the acquisition 
of shares or licences, the fate of privatizations in Greece remains 
uncertain. Undeniably, the most difficult of all will be privatization of the 
SOEs. At this point several unresolved questions remain, for instance: 
which model of privatisation should be followed? Here, it seems that the 
experience of the successful privatisation process in Poland in the early 
1990s has been neglected by the Greek authorities and the Troika. 
                                                          
8 The interesting point here is that receipts from any potential future successful 
privatizations in Greece will not be directed to the state-budget, but to the treasury 
established especially for this purpose, the Hellenic Republic Asset Development 
Fund S.A. Accordingly, any proceeds from privatizations will be reserved for 
servicing Greece’s debt. 
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Moreover, the legal framework for the privatisation process remains a 
sensitive issue. Therefore another question is whether those responsible for 
the process will be granted immunity, thereby shielding them from 
possible unfounded future accusations of political adversaries. As long as the 
above questions remain open, the odds for privatisation in Greece seem low. 
6. The (thorny issue of tax compliance and the) myth  
of tax evasion 
The notions of tax evasion, tax compliance and corruption have been 
making the headlines since late 2009, depicting Greece – at least at the 
popular level and undeservedly so – as a nation of corrupt, notorious tax 
dodgers. As will be argued in this section, to avoid politically costly 
restructuring of the public sector, the tax evasion argument was employed 
instrumentally by the Greek socialist government over the last couple of 
years to manipulate public opinion (at home and abroad) into believing 
that tax evasion and corruption were the causes of Greece’s downturn. 
Furthermore, as fiscal consolidation in Greece over the period May 2010 – 
June 2012 did not yield the expected results and an expenditure drift 
occurred, the same argument of tax evasion was employed by the PASOK 
government to legitimize additional tax increases. In other words, since 
late 2009, the socialist government embarked on a strategy of a ceaseless 
talk of tax evasion, of the necessity to enhance fiscal audit and to “catch” 
the tax dodgers. Unsurprisingly, in the public discourse tax dodgers were 
associated mostly with the rich and with the successful members of the 
society. It can be argued therefore that tax evasion and corruption were 
employed instrumentally by the socialist government for two correlated 
reasons. On the one hand, they served the purpose of diverting the 
society’s attention from the real causes of the crisis, i.e. the huge public 
sector and the abusive role of the state in the economy, in order to create 
an opportunity structure enabling the government to avoid the politically 
costly structural reforms. On the other hand, the same arguments were 
employed to create an image of a committed socialist government engaged 
with issues of social justice. This in turn was to improve the popularity of 
the government and the social support for it. Sadly so, the myth of tax 
evasion and corruption in Greece fell on a fertile ground of naivety, 
misconceptions and stereotypes about Greece and about the causes of the 
crisis. Accordingly, to a considerable extent the myth of tax evasion 
dwarfed the talk of reforms and economic growth in Greece. As the 
argument of tax evasion and corruption seems to be returning to the public 
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discourse regarding the crisis in Greece, it is necessary to make some 
points on it by means of clarification.  
According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2011, Greece occupies the daunting 80th position with a score of 3.4 
(on a scale up to 10.0) and is comparable to El Salvador, Colombia, Morocco, 
Peru and Thailand. Amongst its European peers, Greece is followed only 
by Bulgaria, which receives a score of 3.3. It would seem that the results 
of the Eurobarometer (2012) survey released in February 2012 confirm 
these results, in that 98% of Greek respondents perceive corruption to be a 
major problem in Greece, and 80% of Greek respondents believe that 
corruption within their country is more widespread than in other EU 
countries. As revealing as these findings may be, they are based on 
perceptions aggregated through opinion polls and surveys. Even if 
Transparency International seeks to have its surveys peer reviewed, the 
initial dataset remains subjective. It has long been demonstrated that 
scandals, crises, and allegations of corruption (frequently fuelled by the 
media and employed instrumentally for domestic politicking) affect 
people’s perceptions of the degree of corruption. 
The notions of tax evasion and corruption are frequently (and wrongly) 
blended into a single concept in the public discourse on Greece and seem 
to preoccupy some politicians and opinion-makers at home and abroad. 
Therefore, it is pertinent to elucidate some numbers that are readily 
available on the OECD portal. The provisional data for 2010 indicate that 
total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP was 30.9% in Greece, compared 
to 36.3% in Germany, 28% in Ireland and 48.2% in Denmark. The value of 
taxes on goods and services in 2009 as a percentage of GDP reached 
10.8% in Greece, 11.1% in Germany, 10.1% in Ireland, 11.7% in Poland 
and 15.4% in Denmark. The major difference in the shares of tax 
contributions to total GDP is identifiable for taxes on income and profits. 
In 2009, their share as a percentage of GDP reached a value of 7.6% in 
Greece, compared to 10.8% in Germany, 10.1% in Ireland and 29.4% in 
Denmark. 
In this context, an OECD report (OECD 2011a, 10) notes that 
“personal income tax revenues are more than 5% of GDP below the euro-
area average, although statutory rates are not especially low.” The OECD 
further suggests – rightly so – that the so-called self-employed, including 
plumbers, electricians, nurses etc., might be the culprits in this regard. The 
August 2011 OECD Economic Survey on Greece stated that “[i]f Greece 
collected its VAT, social security contributions and corporate income tax 
with the average efficiency of OECD countries, tax revenues could rise by 
nearly 5% of GDP.” Notably, the value of the VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR) 
Addressing the Crisis in Greece: The Role of Fiscal Policy 
 
234
for Greece is 0.41 (OECD 2011c). This finding implies that 59% of 
potential revenues from VAT are not collected. This number would seem to 
confirm the argument of tax evasion in Greece, were it not for the 
observation that the VRR levels for the UK and Spain are the same as that 
of Greece. Moreover, the VRR value for Germany, 0.55, falls below the 
2008 OECD average (unweighted) of 0.58. 
Overall, the numbers presented here clearly suggest that, although tax 
evasion exists in Greece, it is not as severe a problem as the media and 
some politicians portray it to be. Until 2010, in some cases, Greece fared 
better than other countries, and in some cases the performance of Greece 
was comparable to countries that no-one would dare to call countries of 
tax dodgers. The paradox is that, like in a self-fulfilling prophecy, as a 
result of excessive taxation that caused an exponential contraction of the 
private economy, data for 2011 and 2012 may reveal heightened levels of 
tax evasion as well as growth of the grey sphere of the economy. Whereas 
neither of these two is a welcome development, both of these phenomena 
serve as a depiction of how the state has crowded out private agents from 
the economy to a clear detriment of fiscal consolidation and the reform 
process. Consequently, the insistence by some politicians in the West, 
including the Troika, regarding the argument of tax evasion in Greece is 
worrying in that it overshadows the necessary debate on transforming the 
Greek economic system. The danger here is that an overemphasis on tax 
evasion, and the resulting overemphasis on increasing taxation (a new tax 
law is to be submitted to the Greek Parliament in September 2012), rather 
than a focus on creating conditions for growth (via a sustained effort at 
restructuring the public sector, liberalisation, deregulation and 
privatisation), is counterproductive and thus is likely to capsize genuine 
efforts at rescuing Greece (Visvizi 2012e). 
7. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to discuss the background and the 
scope of the fiscal consolidation process implemented in Greece over the 
period May 2010 – June 2012. A particular focus of the discussion was 
placed on the efficiency and appropriateness of the fiscal policy measures 
introduced by the socialist PASOK government as a means of addressing 
the sovereign debt crisis in Greece. It was argued that contrary to the 
government’s assertions and provisions included in the MoU of May 2010, 
the government deliberately channelled the burden of fiscal adjustment 
towards the private sector of the economy to avoid the politically costly 
necessities of reducing expenditures and restructuring the public sector. 
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Consequently, as a result of tax-based fiscal adjustment, significant 
contractionary effects have occurred in the Greek economy, and general 
government revenues plummeted. Neither exports nor domestic demand 
could offset these contractionary effects. Therefore, in mid-2012, 
i.e., more than two years after the launch of the generous EU-IMF 
€110 billion financial assistance programme for Greece, despite the 
“voluntary bond exchange programme” followed by a second financial 
package worth €130 billion, the outcomes of fiscal adjustment in Greece 
remain at least uncertain. Clearly, the coalition government formed in 
Greece after the June 17 elections seems committed and able to navigate 
the stormy waters of fiscal consolidation. Nevertheless, the domestic and 
external challenges that the coalition government faces are not conducive 
to success (Visvizi 2012a). Having said that, several practical and 
theoretical questions emerge that will be addressed in future research. 
Specifically, on the one hand, it is necessary to investigate the empirical 
pattern of the IMF intervention in Greece and its variability. On the other 
hand, it seems that a closer examination of the theoretical aspects of fiscal 
consolidation in Greece would be needed. 
In the rich body of literature on the variability of fiscal consolidation, a 
number of assumptions and hypotheses regarding the efficiency of fiscal 
consolidation have been tested. In this strand of research, the major 
question is which of the two alternative means of fiscal consolidation, i.e., 
expenditure reduction or revenue enhancement, produces better results. 
Moreover, additional questions include what can serve as a driver of 
growth in periods of fiscal consolidation, i.e., domestic demand or exports, 
and what the role of monetary policy vis-à-vis fiscal consolidation can be. 
Overall, research suggests that “spending-based adjustments are 
considerably less contractionary than tax-based adjustments” (Guajardo 
et al. 2011, 26). In this context, Konstantinou and Tagkalakis (2010, 3) 
conclude that “cuts in direct taxes generate a positive effect on consumer 
and business confidence (…). [At the same time], higher government wage 
bills and government investment reduce confidence, possibly because they 
entail a permanent increase in the size of the public sector, which would 
have to be financed by higher future taxes.” Addressing the question of the 
efficiency of fiscal adjustment in the face of a considerable debt-to-GDP 
ratio, Deák and Lenarčič (2011) observe that “a government spending 
shock has a positive and a tax receipt shock a negative effect on output 
over time. However, if the debt-to-GDP ratio is above [a certain] 
threshold, then fiscal policy has no significant effect on output.” Each of 
these contributions offers important insights likely to benefit the study of 
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the theoretical and empirical patterns of fiscal consolidation in Greece 
over the period 2010–2012. Treating these studies as a point of departure, 
it would be particularly interesting to examine the fiscal consolidation 
process in Greece from the perspective of the “expansionary fiscal 
consolidation” hypothesis (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990) in the absence of 
monetary policy. It should be noted of course that Perotti (2011) questions 
the hypothesis of expansionary fiscal consolidation and its applicability in 
the euro zone. He argues that limited policy options are available to euro-
zone members, i.e., “a depreciation is not available to EMU members, 
except possibly vis-à-vis non‐euro members. [And] an expansion based on 
exports is not available to the world as a whole.” Therefore, as Perotti 
suggests, the odds of expansionary fiscal consolidation in the euro zone 
are low. Yet, because several euro-zone members are currently undergoing 
fiscal consolidation, it could still be of benefit to test the Greek case 
against the expansionary fiscal consolidation hypothesis and to draw 
relevant lessons from it. The questions to be addressed therefore would 
include whether an alternative – to monetary policy measures – policy-mix 
exists to effectively address fiscal imbalances in countries that are 
members of a monetary union. In the specific case of the EMU, would it 
be consistent with domestic-level solutions, with euro-zone-wide 
approaches, or with a combination of both of them? The Greek case bears 
the promise of providing some insights on these questions. 
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